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To ISDS or not to ISDS  
A question of legitimacy in dispute resolution 
By Ioannis GLINAVOS1 
Abstract: Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) has gained prominence in recent years with an explosion in 
the number of investor claims against states. While the evolution of this type of arbitration was expected, its 
focus and context was not. Investors are currently bringing actions against developed states in unanticipated 
policy areas. Greece, facing actions from investors challenging its debt haircut and Spain, battling investor 
challenges to its revamped energy policy are examples of the use of arbitration as a political as well as a dispute 
resolution tool. It is for this reason that the proposal for the inclusion of ISDS in the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) has caused so much heated discussion. This paper examines the recent evolution 
and likely trajectory of investor state dispute settlement, reflecting on consequences for perceptions of arbitration 
and its links with politics and economics. 
 
A. Introduction 
1. We have moved a long way from the view of Scrutton LJ in Czarnikow2 where 
he railed against arbitration declaring ‘there must be no Alsatia in England where 
the King's writ does not run’. Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) has gained 
prominence in recent years with an explosion in the number of investor claims 
against states. While the evolution of this type of arbitration was expected, its 
focus and context was not. Investors are currently bringing actions against 
developed states in unanticipated policy areas. Greece, facing actions from 
investors challenging its debt haircut and Spain, battling investor challenges to its 
revamped energy policy, are examples of the use of arbitration as a political as 
well as a dispute resolution tool. It is for this reason that the proposal for the 
inclusion of ISDS in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
has caused so much heated discussion. This paper examines the recent evolution 
and likely trajectory of ISDS, reflecting on consequences for the future of 
arbitration and its links with politics and economics. The paper starts by examining 
justifications for ISDS from the perspective of emerging economies and proceeds 
to consider the reasons that motivate its expansion in developed states. An 
analysis is made of contemporary use of ISDS in the European Periphery and a 
conclusion is offered reflecting on the future of investor-state dispute resolution. 
                                                             
1 Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Westminster, London UK, i.glinavos@westminster.ac.uk 
2 Czarnikow v Roth, Schmidt & Co. [1922] 2 KB 478 (CA), 489 
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The novelty of this study rests in offering a balanced analysis of the benefits and 
dangers stemming from ISDS, avoiding the passionate cries from both proponents 
and detractors one finds commonly in the literature. 
 
B. ISDS as a development tool 
2. When one thinks of the promotion of development, in terms of economic 
development, thoughts of law and legal processes tend not to be prominent3. 
Nonetheless, an argument can be made that legal institutions are significant in 
creating an environment conducive to investment and in the longer term, it is 
hoped, development4. As the focus of this piece is a discussion of ISDS, we will 
not go into detail in the burgeoning literature linking institutional development 
(including legal modernisation) to growth. It is important nonetheless to mention 
the connection that exists linking protection of the core elements of a market 
economy (respect of property rights and enforcement of contracts) with adequate 
systems that allow the resolution of disputes as to legal rights5.  
 
3. Discourses on international development invariably touch upon the issue of 
incoming investment. After the Second World War foreign direct investment grew 
steadily, yet in an incremental manner, considering the reluctance of most states 
to fully liberalise trade, and especially capital flows. Since the 1980s however, the 
amounts invested have peaked both from developed to developing countries and 
between developing countries themselves6. Attempts to create favourable 
conditions for these investments have included changes to legal regimes and the 
adoption of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), starting with the Germany-
                                                             
3 Kenneth Dam, The Law Development Nexus (Brookings Institute 2006) 
4 Robert Barro, Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross Country Empirical Study (MIT Press 
1997) 
5 Christopher Clague, Institutions and Economic Development: Growth and Governance in Less 
Developed and Post Socialist Countries (The Johns Hopkins University Press 1997) 
6 Susan Aaronson, ‘A Fresh Approach to International Investment Rules’ (Progressive Policy 
Institute 2004) <http://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/2014.5-
Aaronson_A-Fresh-Approach-to-International-Investment-Rules.pdf> accessed 12 December 2015 
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Pakistan one in 19597. However, even if a nation state has legislated the protection 
of private property rights and respects party autonomy in contract formation, this 
does not ensure a legal environment sufficient for attracting investment8. Dispute 
resolution institutions capable of giving definition to legal rights, being able to 
resolve disputes over entitlements and award compensation when due, are crucial 
in completing the foundations to market activity9. As the post-communist 
experience demonstrates, while the recognition of property and contractual rights 
may be an achievable objective in the short term, the creation of a judicial system 
capable of supporting commercial activity is a wholly different challenge10. How 
can therefore a foreign investor take advantage of opportunities in a country 
where institutional deficiencies mean there are significant enforcement risks if 
agreements are not honoured? Further, when a foreign investor contracts with the 
state, or a state entity, what assurance is there that the deal will be respected? 
While we need to acknowledge that deficiencies in legal institutions are never a 
sufficient reason to avoid investing, they can poison those investment 
environments that are already seen as highly risky. 
 
4. With these considerations in mind, a state wishing to attract foreign investment 
as part of a general development plan, could opt to out-source (in a way) dispute 
resolution as a means of dealing with deficiencies in domestic adjudication 
structures. This can be a cost-effective solution that lowers risks to the investor, 
yet allows the nation state to reap the benefits of an improved climate, while 
continuing to work on augmenting institutional capabilities. Indeed an argument 
has been made that ‘off-shoring’ dispute resolution could indeed help the 
development of domestic institutions. By making markets open to competition, 
BITs could contribute to breaking domestic monopolies and oligopolies, resulting 
                                                             
7 Mary Hallward-Driemeier, ‘Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract FDI?’ (World Bank Working 
Paper, DECRG June 2003) 
8 Kevin Davis and Michael Trebilcock, ‘Legal Reforms and Development’ (2001) 22(1) Third World 
Quarterly 21 
9 Julio Faundez, Good Governance and Law: Legal and Institutional Reform in Developing Countries 
(Palgrave Macmillan 1996) 
10 Ioannis Glinavos ‘Neoliberal Law: Unintended Consequences of Market Friendly Law Reforms’ 
(2008) 29(6) Third World Quarterly 1087 
CIArb Chapter Contribution  ©Ioannis Glinavos 2017 
 
Page 4 of 12 
 
in greater levels of judicial and regulatory independence11. It is even possible that 
some form of regulatory competition arises among national and supra-national 
adjudication institutions. International arbitration, according to this view, could 
spur domestic courts to compete for the business of resolving commercial disputes 
and thus improve their quality12. An international commitment to arbitrate could 
also be seen as a domestic defence mechanism that helps insulate the state from 
local rent-seeking efforts, thus improving the administration of justice. 
 
5. This is exactly the rationale behind investor state dispute resolution that takes 
place in international fora, outside the national legal domain where the investment 
is located. But does the above actually work? There is some evidence that this 
institutional segmentation has worked in appeasing investors in the case of China. 
Due to the distaste of foreign investors for local courts, the China International 
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) is the most utilized 
arbitration institution in the world today, having become the arbitration institution 
of choice for investors in China by virtue of its quality. While CIETAC is not strictly 
speaking the same as ISDS tribunals, its presence has resulted in a two-tiered 
system of dispute resolution in China: a relatively high quality institution for 
foreign investment and a relatively corrupt, low quality institution for domestic 
adjudication. Whether this system has spurred improvements in local dispute 
resolution capabilities is a highly contested matter13. The next section discusses 
ISDS from the perspective of developed nations, where its function and 
justification is quite different. 
 
C. ISDS and policy consistency 
6. The rationale for expanding use of ISDS in developed nations, which do not 
suffer from the institutional deficiencies of developing states is rather different. In 
what are considered ‘western’ jurisdictions there are broadly no concerns as to 
the rule of law and the ability of national judicial systems to deal with complex 
disputes involving foreign investors. There is also a mature system that allows a 
                                                             
11 Tom Ginsburg, ‘International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: BITs and Governance’ 
(2005) 25 International Review of Law and Economics 107, 119 
12 Stephen Copp, The Legal Foundations of Free Markets (Institute of Economic Affairs 2008) 
13 Ali Shahla and Tom Ginsburg, International Commercial Arbitration in Asia (3rd edn, Juris 2013) 
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distinction between state assets in a diplomatic sense and state assets in a 
commercial sense. A foreign investor therefore will not have to worry about the 
competence of adjudicators or procedural efficiency when bringing a claim against 
a government or government entity in French, Swiss or English courts, to use 
some common examples. 
 
7. If ISDS is not used as a way to by-pass problems with domestic dispute 
resolution therefore, what purpose does it serve in developed nations, and why is 
it standard practice to insert such clauses in BITs even between large trading 
powers? The answer is that ISDS is seen as a method of ensuring policy 
consistency. While developed nations offer an advanced regulatory framework and 
robust judicial systems, they do not always guarantee policy consistency, which is 
the hallmark of a stable investment climate. From the point of view of business, 
ISDS is a necessary tool in a menu of adjudication options that includes (but is 
not limited to) national courts in any country. While the efficiency of the court 
systems in developed states is not in question, investors still express the wish for 
the speedy and secure (in terms of awarding compensation) mechanisms of ISDS, 
normally under the auspices of the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID). This has become an issue of heated debate in the 
context of the TTIP negotiations between the EU and the USA. Responding to 
proposals14 for an Investment Court that will replace ad-hoc ISDS tribunals under 
BITs between EU member states and the USA, business leaders have expressed 
concern that it will become more difficult for investors to be compensated for 
treaty violations. Such comments have gained some traction with the European 
Parliament with Christopher Fjellner, an MEP from the European People’s Party in 
the Parliament’s International Trade committee arguing against the concept of an 
Investment Court, saying that the purpose of ISDS is to grant quick arbitration 
between states and investors15.  
                                                             
14 Commission ‘Proposal for investment protection and Court System for TTIP’ (12.11.15) 
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf> accessed 12 
December 2015  
15 Hans Burchard, ‘Business slams Malmström’s TTIP pitch’ Politico.eu (13 October 15) 
<http://www.politico.eu/article/ttip-business-lobby-slams-malmstroms-arbitration-proposal-isds-
businesseurope/> accessed 12 December 2015 
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8. From the point of view of the European Commission, the inclusion of ISDS in 
TTIP seems to be a structured defence against perceived threats to sovereignty, 
while at the same time it is part of an effort to encourage the spread of alternative 
methods to resolve disputes in cross border commercial, trade and investment 
matters. In summary, the aim of including ISDS in TTIP is to guarantee national 
treatment for foreign investors, offer a non-national based system for the 
resolution of disputes between investors and host governments and ensure the 
payment of effective compensation (while ensuring policy autonomy). The reason 
why this cannot be done by maintaining the existing ISDS provisions is a perceived 
need to clarify the basis on which investors can bring cases against states, 
strengthen governments’ rights to regulate, increase transparency via making 
information about cases accessible and allowing amicus curiae submissions16. The 
Commission seeks to operationalise the above by proposing an Investment Court, 
as mentioned earlier.  
 
9. We can conclude therefore that the motivations of investors and the EU 
institutions as to the desirability of ISDS, in the developed economy context, are 
divergent. Is it correct to assume, as many in the business world do, that policy 
consistency is an area of concern in Europe (and to an extent in the USA)? To help 
illustrate how ISDS can be used as a guarantee of policy sustainability when faced 
with the threat of significant regulatory reversals we can look at two recent 
examples from the European Periphery, that of Greece and Spain. 
 
D. ISDS in the European Periphery 
(1) Greece 
10. Greece has been the target of investor actions due to the consequences of its 
Private Sector Involvement (PSI) deal17 in early 2012. The PSI is largely 
                                                             
16 Commission ‘The top 10 myths about TTIP’ (2014) <http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/the-top-10-
myths-about-ttip-pbNG0614128/> accessed 12 December 2015 
17 David Oakley and Mary Watkins, ‘Greece launches debt swap offer’ Financial Times (24 February 
12) <http://on.ft.com/z6OfP1> accessed 12 December 2015  
CIArb Chapter Contribution  ©Ioannis Glinavos 2017 
 
Page 7 of 12 
 
responsible for transferring the burden of any potential Greek default from private 
hands onto public coffers and involved a swap of sovereign bonds resulting in a 
haircut of 53.5%. It worked via the retrospective insertion of Collective Action 
Clauses (CACs)18 in the bond contracts. The PSI constituted an unprecedented 
policy reversal for a developed economy. It was the first time in modern history 
that a non-emerging economy had effectively defaulted on its loans19. 
Unsurprisingly, foreign investors sought legal redress arguing that their 
investments had been forcefully expropriated.  
 
11. Greece has faced two cases at ICSID already on this issue. The first case 
involved Slovakian bank Poštová Banka and its Cypriot subsidiary Istrokapital. 
They argued that under the Greece-Slovak Republic and the Cyprus-Greece 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), they were entitled to compensation for losses 
they suffered due to the PSI, amounting roughly to half the invested amount of 
€504m20. The Tribunal found that it did not have jurisdiction to hear Poštová’s 
claim. This was primarily because Poštová was not the holder of the bonds, but a 
participant in an investment fund with indirect claims to the bonds. Poštová lost 
on jurisdiction because of the exact wording of the Greek-Slovakia BIT it was 
relying on (Istrokapital had no standing as a subsidiary). Poštová filed a request 
for partial annulment of this decision in August 2015 which failed21. The second 
case involved Cyprus Popular Bank (Laiki). Laiki has proved an eager litigant as it 
was already involved in an action against Greece, this time for the provision (or 
lack thereof) of Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) to its Greek subsidiaries that 
led to the resolution of Cyprus’ two biggest banks. The PSI challenge of Laiki was 
                                                             
18 Giuseppe Bianco, ‘Collective Action Clauses in the Eurozone’ (2014) 16 European Journal of Law 
Reform 713 
19 Allen & Overy, ‘How the Greek debt reorganisation of 2012 changed the rules of sovereign 
insolvency’ (Global Law Intelligence Unit 2012) 
<http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/AO%20-
%20Greek%20debt%20reorganisation%20of%202012.pdf> accessed 12 December 2015  
20 Ioannis Glinavos, ’Haircut Undone? The Greek Drama and Prospects for Investment Arbitration’ 
(2014) 5(3) Journal of International Dispute Settlement 475 
21 ICSID Case No. ARB/13/8, Annulment Proceeding (29 September 2016) 
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filed late September 201522, claiming billions of euros in compensation for losses 
suffered in 2012 when Laiki’s 2.8 billion portfolio of Greek bonds was subjected to 
the haircut. Adding this claim to the ELA action leads to a claim totalling 4 billion 
Euros. 
 
12. Could a policy decision, like that expressed by the PSI violate BIT standards 
of investor protection? The most likely claims by investors will be expropriation 
and discriminatory treatment. Expropriation under BITs23 can occur only in 
accordance with international law standards, and it needs to be non-discriminatory 
and followed by a payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation. 
Modern BITs place emphasis on safeguarding the sanctity of a contract by 
protecting it against regulatory and other governmental action that thwarts the 
normal legitimate expectations of the investor. The key issue will be, therefore, 
whether a reduction of the face value of a sovereign bond is an exercise of 
legitimate state powers, or a form of expropriation that gives rise to a claim for 
compensation under international law. Investors claim that the introduction of the 
CACs by legislation constitutes a sovereign act which resulted in the diminution in 
value of their investment. The loss sustained could be treated as an expropriation 
warranting compensation. The allegation of unlawful expropriation would be based 
upon the lack of compensation for the losses suffered by the investor (diminution 
of value of the bonds), and potentially discriminatory treatment as the haircut did 
not extend to the institutional holdings of Greek bonds (eg. ECB held bonds), nor 
to those Greek bonds denominated in foreign currencies. Under a Most Favoured 
Nation (MFN) clause such discrimination would be considered a violation of Treaty 
standards. On the assumption therefore that investors convince the tribunal to 
proceed (overcoming jurisdictional challenges), and win on the substantive 
                                                             
22 Sotiris Nikas, ‘Cyprus seeks PSI damages for Laiki Bank’ eKathimerini (1 October 2015) 
<http://www.ekathimerini.com/202112/article/ekathimerini/business/cyprus-seeks-psi-damages-
for-laiki-bank> accessed 12 December 2015 
23 Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (2nd edn, OUP 
2012) 
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grounds (expropriation), they would claim restitution to the face value of the pre-
haircut bonds24. 
(2) Spain 
13. Spain’s position is arguably a lot worse that Greece’s. Since 2007 Spain has 
repeatedly revised its incentive system for renewable energy generation (including 
Photovoltaic-PV), resulting in a significantly less attractive environment for 
investors. The Spanish government has now initiated a system whereby renewable 
power subsidies have been drastically reduced. Up until recently, energy from 
renewable sources was subsidised with a fixed remuneration, which meant that 
the return on investment was significantly higher in many cases than it would 
have been under normal open market conditions25. This system was effectively 
ended as of 2014 and renewables power plants now compete with all other forms 
of energy on the wholesale market on equal terms, trying to sell as much 
electricity as possible, incurring meanwhile significantly higher costs of 
generation26. While solar (PV) plants are expected to be less severely impacted 
than other generators of renewables, the impacts are financial as well as 
operational. Spain’s Feed-In-Tariff reductions had already triggered significant 
asset impairments, which motivated investors in solar and wind energy to launch 
ISDS proceedings to claim economic loss. 
 
14. As could be expected, foreign investors in the Spanish Photovoltaic market 
have not accepted the radical changes to the regulatory environment and the 
deconstruction of incentive schemes for renewables without a fight. They 
uniformly resorted to ISDS tribunals seeking redress, for what many perceive to 
be the end of solar energy generation in Spain. Many of these cases come under 
                                                             
24 Ioannis Glinavos, ‘Digging Up the Past: Can Greece Handle Another PSI Challenge?’ Kluwer 
Arbitration Blog (20 October 2015) <http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2015/10/20/digging-up-
the-past-can-greece-handle-another-psi-challenge/> accessed 12 December 2015  
25 Jeannine Gehle, ‘Spain and Italy reduce feed-in tariffs’ Sun and Wind Energy (26 June 2014) 
<http://www.sunwindenergy.com/photovoltaics/spain-and-italy-reduce-feed-tariffs> accessed 12 
December 2015  
26 Ilias Tsagas, ‘Spanish supreme court paves way for lawsuits against solar FIT cuts’ PV Magazine 
(23 October 2014) <http://www.pv-magazine.com/news/details/beitrag/spanish-supreme-court-
paves-way-for-lawsuits-against-solar-fit-cuts_100016907/> accessed 12 December 2015 
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the auspices of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). Along with NAFTA, the ECT is 
the most successful initiative in regulating foreign direct investment, specifically 
for the energy sector. The ECT takes forward the thinking behind BITs in 
establishing a comprehensive framework of investment promotion and protection 
on a multilateral level27. The Treaty aims to protect foreign investors from 
important political risks in the host country, safeguard the sovereignty of host 
states over their natural resources, provide comprehensive coverage of 
investment, trade and transit issues, and offer a discussion forum for better 
cooperation in the field of energy trade. It sets up a comprehensive dispute 
settlement mechanism covering both investor-state and intra-state disputes. The 
ECT secretariat lists dozens of cases against Spain, with ICSID having registered 
the vast majority of energy related cases since 201328. Actions are not only coming 
from PV investors caught unawares by the Spanish crisis. For instance, Investment 
funds RREEF (owned by Deutsche Bank) and Antin (owned by BNP Paribas), sued 
at ICSID in 2013, having only acquired solar-thermal power plants in 2011, by 
which point the Spanish government had already made significant cuts to 
subsidies and the Spanish economic difficulties were well-known29. 
 
15. The claims are based on allegations of indirect expropriation, or alternatively, 
for violations of the Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) standard. The relevant 
ECT provisions are Articles 10 on the promotion, protection and treatment of 
investments, and 13 on expropriation. The efforts of the Spanish government to 
make the country a leader in renewable energy generation in the first half the 
2000s could be said to substantiate claims that Spain promised a stable and 
welcoming environment to PV generators, which acted as a guarantee of their 
successful commercial enterprise and financial viability. A claimant could argue 
that Spain breached Treaty FET standards through arbitrary conduct, 
                                                             
27 Craig Bamberger, Jan Linahana and Thomas Walde, ‘Energy Charter Treaty in 2000: In a New 
Phase’ (2000) 18(3) J of Energy & Nat Resources Law 331 
28 Cecilia Olivet and Pia Eberhardt, ‘Profiting from Crisis’ Transnational Institute (March 2014) 
<https://www.tni.org/files/download/profiting_from_crisis_1.pdf> accessed 12 December 2015  
29 Sebastian Perry, ‘Deutsche Bank takes on Spain over energy reforms’ Global Arbitration Review 
(12 November 2012) <http://globalenergyreview.co.uk/news/article/4290/deutsche-bank-takes-
spain-energy-reforms/> accessed 12 December 2015 
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administrative negligence and insufficiency of action. The core argument would be 
about specifying the meaning of the investor’s legitimate expectations. In LG&E 
Energy Corp et al., v. Argentine Republic30 for example it was held that any such 
expectations must be based on conditions offered by or prevailing in the host State 
at the time the original investment is made. As regards the expropriation 
protections under Article 13 of the ECT, claimants are likely to argue that evidence 
shows that policy changes were tainted by politics and factional interests, 
benefiting other energy providers to the detriment of clean energy producers. It 
is also possible to argue that the expropriation was discriminatory because the 
whole sector was not affected in a linear fashion, with the impact falling more 
heavily on certain producers depending on the length of their involvement in the 
Spanish market31.  
 
16. Could the claims of investors succeed against the two countries looked at, 
considering that Greece and Spain were arguably responding to an economic 
emergency? A necessity defence as a matter of customary international law is 
unlikely to work when it is based on economic calamities. A good example of the 
fate of such arguments before ISDS Tribunals is Argentina, which in its recent 
ICSID cases is alleging that due to the severe economic emergency it faced in 
2001-2002, it was left with no choice but to adopt the measures it did. The 
argument presumably relies on concepts such as the impossibility of performance 
or the fundamental change of circumstances, as set forth in Articles 61 and 62, 
respectively, of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969. Argentina 
(like Greece and Spain) faces the problem that even if it is accepted that economic 
emergency allows a state to claim necessity or force majeure as a defence to the 
claims of wrongfulness, the threshold as set by tribunals seems insurmountable32. 
Greece and Spain could well lose in these ISDS tribunals. The following concluding 
                                                             
30 ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability (3 October 2006) 
31 Constantin Gurdgiev and Liam Leonard, Lessons from the Great Recession (Emerald 2016) 251-
271 
32 Paolo Di Rosa, ‘The Recent Wave of Arbitrations Against Argentina under BITs’ (2004-5) 36(1) 
Inter-American Law Review 41 
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section discusses the possible consequences of that eventuality and reflects on 
the future of ISDS. 
 
E. Conclusion 
17. The above discussion has explored the aims of ISDS examining its rationale 
from the perspective of developing and developed states. We saw that ISDS is 
offered as a cure to institutional weaknesses in emerging economies and put 
forward as a shield against policy reversals in developed ones. An overall 
perception of arbitration as an efficient, speedy, cost-effective method of dispute 
resolution in the field of investor-state disputes which reaches secure outcomes 
underlies all arguments for the inclusion of ISDS clauses in bilateral and 
multilateral instruments. Such perception however is currently under challenge 
from two main directions. First, the proposals of the EU Commission on the 
creation of an Investment Court that will handle ISDS under the TTIP worries 
business as it threatens, according to some, to politicise disputes and dilute the 
finality of the process by opening easy avenues for appeal. Second, recent 
experiences of the use of ISDS in the European Periphery to challenge measures 
taken as emergency responses to the economic crisis worry those concerned with 
sovereignty and the need to maintain policy discretion in times of difficulty. 
 
18. Indeed, the core virtue of ISDS which is its ability to bind governments to 
commitments as to the future treatment of investors is also its Achilles heel. If we 
are using ISDS in the developed economy context to protect against policy 
reversals, are we using it to set limits to government discretion and by extension 
democracy? This concern is often voiced with anger from NGOs, political parties 
and activists fighting against the TTIP. While the argument is often put in 
hysterical terms, it is not without merit. The future of ISDS in the next 100 years 
of arbitration will depend on navigating this limited space between constraining 
democracy and preserving a welcoming investment environment. Perhaps sadly, 
elegant work on law and economics, jurisprudence and theory will be set aside if 
investors succeed in convincing tribunals that they are right in their claims against 
Greece and Spain, with the consequence that the taxpayer has to fund their 
compensation. 
